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Introduction
Since the pathbreaking study of Berle and Means (1932) , which was the first to put light on the fact that large American corporations were usually not run by their owners, a whole branch of research evolved investigating into the effects of the separation of ownership and control. However, the implications of the findings of Berle and Means remained almost unnoticed for a long time before Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed their "theory of the firm", and thereby explicitly modelled the effects of the dispersion of ownership and control. The studies of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) have been among the first to empirically test the effects of managerial equity ownership (i.e. insider ownership) on firm value. Since then several studies have been published on that issue.
Two important results emerge from this branch of literature. First, most of these studies provide evidence that insider ownership actually affects firm value, although the relationship seems not to be monotonic. A positive impact of insider ownership on firm value can be explained by the so-called convergence-of-interest hypothesis, stating that larger equity shares of insiders should be associated with higher market valuations due to lower agency costs. In contrast, a negative relation can be explained by the so-called entrenchment hypothesis, predicting that insider ownership above a certain threshold will have a value destroying effect due to the upcoming conflict between large blockholders (in this case the management) and the dispersed shareholders. These two hypotheses serve as an explanation for the bellshaped relationship between insider ownership and firm value found by McConnell and Servaes (1990) or the piecewise-linear relationship discovered by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) in their previous study.
However, a serious theoretical objection against the approach used in these studies has been put forward by Demsetz (1983) . He argues that insider ownership is endogenously determined and, hence, cannot be a determinant of firm value. His arguments are supported by the evidence presented in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , where firm size, volatility, return on assets and industry evolve as adequate explanatory variables for the ownership structure of US corporations. Hence, it may well be that low levels of managerial ownership turn out to be an optimal incentive arrangement in those firms whose firm value tends do be lower than in other companies, where higher levels of insider ownership are optimal. As long as one cannot control for the variables being responsible for this relationship, i.e. there is unobserved firm heterogeneity, the detected correlation between ownership and firm performance might just be spurious.
Therefore, more recent studies pay special attention to this problem of endogeneity. In fact, the second important result emerging from the pertinent literature indicates that by using more advanced econometric methods that allow to partially control for endogeneity it seems that firm performance is not affected by managerial ownership. 1 However, some doubts are left preventing these results from being accepted as a final outcome. Evidently, in a perfect frictionless capital market competitive forces would make sure that every company puts a value maximizing ownership structure in place. By definition, insider ownership would be endogenous and presumably determined, among other factors, by the company's performance. Under such a theoretical perspective the question itself, whether firm performance depends on the ownership structure, is nonsense.
However, pondering on the vast corporate governance literature that emerged over the last decade may challenge this theoretical perspective. Several questions arise in this context. First of all, do corporate governance regimes really allow market forces to put value maximizing ownership structures in place? Isn't it true that in many countries, including the US, several mechanisms exist allowing managers to shelter themselves from the market for corporate control? And, finally, isn't it true that ownership structure often is rather inert, making a flexible adjustment to changing market conditions unlikely? From these questions it follows immediately that more evidence on the ownership-performance relationship is needed, especially under different corporate governance regimes.
This study makes a contribution to the literature exactly under this perspective. First, as a code law country, the whole German corporate governance regime is very different from that governing common law countries. As a stylized fact, in code law countries investor protection regularly is lower and the market for corporate control is more hampered. 2 This is particulary true for Germany, as Franks and Mayer (1990) or Wenger and Kaserer (1998a) have pointed out. Therefore, it might well be that ownership structure does not flexibly adapt to pressures coming from investors searching for value gains. This inertia in the ownership structure is enhanced by the fact that blockholdings have been of particular importance in Germany. These blockholdings where due to presence of a large number of familycontrolled companies and to a dense network of corporate cross-holdings. 3 It is interesting in this regard to note that according to a recently evolving branch of the literature, which pays particular attention to a special case of insider ownership by looking at the impact of family ownership on firm performance, new evidence has been found corroborating the presumption that ownership structure matters to performance.
The second contribution of this paper is more technical, but nevertheless interesting. Almost all papers investigating the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance aim to measure the latter by Tobin's Q, i.e. by putting the market value of a company in relation to the replacement value of its assets. In practice, however, Tobin's Q is approximated by a firm's market-to-book ratio. We have strong reservations whether the market-to-book ratio can really be taken as a proxy for firm value, at least in a Continental-European accounting context, where historical cost accounting is still important. Therefore, we measure firm performance by the stock price return.
Our results indicate that there is a significantly positive relationship between insider ownership and firm performance as measured by stock price performance over a five year period. In order to account for possible endogeneity we employ an instrumental variable two-stage least squares regression approach. It turns out that results seem not to be driven by endogeneity. Moreover, we also find outside blockownership as well as more concentrated insider ownership to have a positive impact on corporate performance. Hence, the paper is in line with the perception that ownership may have an autonomous influence on firm performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief literature review. Section 3 explains the research design as well as the data set, while section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
A Brief Review of the Literature
As has been mentioned, the first studies investigating into the relationship between insider ownership, as measured by top-managements' shareholdings, and firm value have been those of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) . Both papers found a significant, non-monotonic relationship. The most important theoretical objection against the approach used in these studies has been put forward by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) . Basically, they argue that in competitive capital market environment market forces will make sure that every company chooses its value maximizing ownership structure. Hence, inside ownership is an endogenously determined variable and any observed correlation of ownership and firm value is, basically, meaningless. In fact, the relationship of inside ownership with firm value value might be due to some firm characteristics that are unobservable for the econometrician. As a consequence, an endogeneity problem arises, because ownership structure and firm value are determined simultaneously. In fact, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show that ownership structure of US companies is plausibly determined by firm size, stock price volatility, industry affiliation, and some other variables. According to their view this corroborates the understanding that ownership structure is endogenously determined. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) extend Demsetz and Lehns' results by using a fixed effects panel data model and instrumental variables to control for possible unobserved firm heterogeneity. They conclude, that most variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity and that managerial ownership does not affect firm performance to an econometrically observable extent. Research presented by Loderer and Martin (1997) points in the same direction. They construct a simultaneous equation system for a set of companies involved in acquisitions which handles performance and insider ownership as endogenous variables. As a result, insider ownership does not have a predictive effect on performance in their model, but the other way round performance has a negative effect on insider ownership. Cho (1998) , after being able to replicate the results of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, builds a simultaneous equation system consisting of three equations where insider ownership, performance and investment are treated as endogenous variables. Similarly to Loderer and Martin performance seems to influence ownership but not vice versa.
An integrated approach, where insider ownership is treated as only one of seven corporate governance mechanisms, is taken by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) who present evidence of interdependence among these mechanisms in a large sample of US firms. The positive effect of insider ownership on firm performance, which was found if each mechanism was examined separately, disappears in the integrated model, broadly supporting Demsetz' theory of the optimal use of control mechanisms. A similar procedure is later taken by Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) . They are able to find evidence for their hypothesis that takeover defenses, takeovers, management turnover, corporate performance, capital structure, and ownership structure are interrelated and, thus, should be examined in a system of simultaneous equations. However, they admit that "such a system of equations is nontrivial" and even looks less feasible for studies about non US markets, where data availabil-ity and quality often represent a serious problem. Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2005) , following the methodology of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , model a simultaneous equation system which defines block ownership, a constructed firm-specific corporate governance index, board size, outside representation of the board, and leverage as relevant corporate governance mechanisms besides insider ownership. Using a sample of 109 Swiss listed companies they find evidence for the widespread hypothesis of a positive relationship between corporate governance and performance.
Recently, a new branch in the literature has evolved which investigates into the effects of family-control. Evidently, family ownership has to be seen mostly as a special case of insider ownership and therefore this new family business literature is quite relevant for the insider ownership issue as well. This is even more true for Germany, where family businesses traditionally attracted a lot of attention given their predominate economic role. For the US, recently Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that family ownership is present in a third of all S&P 500 companies and that family firms outperform non-family firms, thus suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational structure. Villalonga and Amit (2005) , looking at all Fortune 500 companies during 1994-2000, come to the conclusion that family ownership creates value for the case that the founder serves as CEO or as chairman of the family firm. We argue that family ownership is stickier than equity ownership of hired managers. Therefore, as it is quite unrealistic to assume that this type of ownership adjusts continuously to changing market conditions, it may be improbable that family ownership is endogenously determined, except in the very long run. Actually, these results are at least challenging from a perspective, where insider ownership and corporate value are simultaneously determined. 4 While previous results are predominantly derived from US data, also some international evidence exists. For the UK, Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005) find that the insider ownership-corporate value relationship is co-deterministic giving further evidence to the work of Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia or Cho. For Japan, Chen, Guo, and Mande (2003) are able to find a positiv relation between insider ownership and firm performance, if they control for fixed effects. Their results are stable to the treatment of insider ownership and Tobin's Q (as a measure of firm performance) as endogenous variables in a simultaneous equation system. For Switzerland, Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2005) also find a significantly positive effect of managerial ownership on firm valuation. Their findings also remain stable, if insider ownership is integrated in a simultaneous equation system, thus suggesting that the influence of insider ownership on performance does actually exist.
Given the fact that results coming from code law countries tend to be in conflict with US evidence, the presumption arises that the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance might be influenced by the corporate governance regime. Therefore, it is very interesting that some studies dealing with German family firms corroborate the view that ownership matters for firm value. For instance, by locking at the long run performance of a matching sample of 62 family and 62 non-family firms, Ehrhardt, Nowak, and Weber (2004) show that family businesses outperform non-family firms in operating performance, but not with respect to stock price performance. In an earlier study of 105 IPOs of German family-owned firms Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003) found that the long run abnormal performance of family firms was affected by the family ownership pattern during a three year post-IPO period. Bott (2002) , who analyzes the effects of announcements of changes in shareholder structures with regard to shareholder concentration and shareholder identity, does not find convincing evidence that stock market reactions to those announcements depend on the identity of the shareholders.
Besides founding family ownership, the concentration of share ownership has attracted some German research recently. For example, Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) show that for most types of large shareholders the benefits of concentrated ownership through greater monitoring of management and reduced agency conflicts equal or sometimes even significantly outweigh the harmful effects of concentration, e.g. private benefits through exploitation of minority shareholders. Hereby, they especially distinguish between control rights and cash flow rights, which usually differ when non-voting share classes exist. While looking at control rights seems appropriate for the examination of monitoring effects, cash flow rights seem to be the right measure for the investigation of alignment of interest effects. Hence, we define share ownership as the portion of cash flow rights throughout this study, because intuitively the monitoring effect of block ownership can not be assumed to be present in the case of managerial ownership. The results of Edwards and Weichenrieder are in line with prior findings of Edwards and Nibler (2000) which concluded that ownership concentration is a more important factor in the German corporate governance system than banks, which originally were thought to posses a dominating role.
Methodology and Data

Methodolody
In this study, we will use a cross-section of German listed companies to examine current shareholder structures and the phenomenon of insider ownership. Though being aware of the problems arising from the use of mere cross-sectional data, we decided to use them because of the following reasons: First, since insider ownership in Germany experienced little attraction in research until now, we thought that it is still necessary to better understand shareholder structures at large and to learn more about the appropriate measurement of insider ownership before going into a deeper analysis. Second, since the historical availability of shareholder structure data in Germany is rather limited, the construction of a large and comprehensive panel data set faces an enormous effort. Furthermore, it is not clear if such an effort would be rewarded, because poor data quality might pose natural limits to the examination of low frequency (e.g. yearly) shareholder structure data. Third, as we will show in section 4 inside ownership tends to be rather sticky, limiting the insights from a panel data analysis.
We will address our research question in a three step analysis. In a first step, explicit attention is paid to the descriptive statistics. This is done in section 3.4, where a comparison with prior findings for the German market is presented. In a second step, section 4 presents the results of an OLS-regression estimation in order to gain a more extensive understanding about the effectiveness of insider ownership as a corporate governance mechanism. Finally, we follow the contemporary research trend to build a simultaneous equation system to treat insider ownership and performance as endogenous variables. In this way we should be able to control for endogeneity in our data set.
Sample Selection
The universe for the cross sectional sample comprises all companies, which were member of the CDAX at the end of 2003 and 1998, i.e. in existence during the past five years. 5 The way how the final sample was derived is shown in table 1.
Insert table 1
From a total of 520 share classes 245 firms have been left in the data set after excluding secondary share classes, financial firms, firms with missing data, and another 86 companies, which are not listed in the CDAX as of 31.12.2003, we were left with a total of 294 companies. 6 However, complete data sets are available for only 238 companies. Consequently, our sample captures 51,5% of all and 62,6% of all non-financial CDAX companies as of 31.12.1998.
Definition of Variables
The ownership structure variables constitute a key element in this analysis and, hence, deserve additional attention. The shareholder structures has been taken from the 2004-I edition of Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. Identified shareholders have been classified manually according to a proprietary scheme which is further described in table 2.
Insert table 2
In line with common research all members of both boards, i.e. the management board ("Vorstand") and the supervisory board ("Aufsichtsrat"), as well as their families are defined as being insiders (coded as MB and SB). In addition, we also identify a third group of "quasi-insiders", in which we classified all former members of the boards and their families (FBM). For this reason the insider definition used in this study deviates from that normally used in the literature. Nevertheless, this may be reasonable as in this way we account for a peculiarity of German companies, were former board members with large ownership stakes often execute considerable influence on "their'" former companies without being officially in charge. Because we are ignorant of the appropriate measure for insider ownership in Germany we will test these single measures individually as well as in combination, where total insider ownership is defined as the total equity stake controlled altogether by the three insider groups (MB SB FBM).
Besides insiders, we define non-financial corporates, investment companies, banks, insurance companies, other institutional investors, government, outside individuals, 5 The condition that companies must have been CDAX members for the past five years is introduced because we decided to track performance over this period.
6 Most of the 86 companies were either acquired by another listed companies or delisted after a squeeze-out. We are aware of the fact that this criterion may induce a sample selection bias into our analysis. However, since only few of these companies actually went bankrupt and we did not find any signs of systematic differences of these firms compared to the sample firms, we think that the potential bias is manageable from an econometric point of view. treasury shares (of course not a real owner type), employees, and others as relevant outside ownership groups. As a result, for each company an ownership structure by owner type becomes available, where the individual variables express the percentage share owned by the respective groups. As mentioned in section 2, we decided to use cash flow instead of control rights for measuring ownership. 7 Alongside ownership type variables also two ownership concentration variables, BLOCK O and BLOCK NO, are computed, indicating the cumulative share owned by all outside blockholders owning at least 5% and the number of those outside blockholders, respectively. These variables are introduced because there is a widespread believe that block ownership constitutes an effective monitoring mechanism. Consequently, an interdependency between insider ownership and block ownership is probable.
An overview of all key variables used in this study and their descriptions is given in table 3. Firm performance is measured as Tobin's Q (Q AV) as well as on the basis of historical stock returns (SR AV). As suggested by Chung and Pruitt (1994) , Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , and Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2005) we use the "simple" Tobin's Q. Hence, Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of the firm divided by its book value. The market value is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity 8 plus the book value of debt. The book value of the firm is approximated by the book value of total assets. It should be noted that according to the definition of Tobin's Q the denominator should be the replacement cost of total assets. Following other studies we proxy the unobservable replacement costs by the book value. However, as has already been pointed out there are strong objections against this procedure in a Continental-European accounting context, where historical cost accounting is still prevalent. 9 Hence, we put much more emphasis on the results where firm performance is measured on the basis of stock price returns.
It should be noted that this approach, in a certain sense, is more conservative than the firm value approach used in the US literature. To see this, assume that for whatever reason there is a positive relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. If the market is completely aware of this relationship, stock prices would react accordingly right in the moment when the ownership structure becomes public. Hence, as long as there is no change in the ownership structure no underor outperformance would be observable, even though insider controlled companies would be economically successful. Under these conditions our approach would not be able to detect any relation between insider ownership and firm performance. However, if the market does not fully reflect the benefits of insider control right from the beginning, stock price returns would convey partial information about the market's assessment of the benefits of insider ownership. It seems plausible that the market is affected by such learning effects, especially if longer periods are taken into consideration. However, the longer the period of observation the more likely it is that even a rather sticky ownership variable is subject to changes and, hence, the stock price movement would be affected by such changes. For that reason we chose an observation period of 5 years, being sufficiently long in order to account for the market's learning effects, but sufficiently short not to be too much affected by 7 Meanwhile control rights are measured by the share of voting shares (usually ordinary shares), cash flow rights also include potential non-voting shares (usually preferred shares).
8 To reduce fluctuations in the market value of equity, we followed Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2005, p. 25) by computing the market value of equity as the mean of daily observations during 2003.
9 For similar objections cf. Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004, p. 152) .
changes in the insider ownership structure. 10 Finally, it should be noted that stock returns are calculated as the arithmetic average of 60 monthly total returns from December 1998 to December 2003. All market data and accounting information are drawn from the Datastream and Worldscope database.
Insert table 3 Besides ownership and performance variables a number of control variables are introduced. Firm Size (LN ASSETS), measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, is included to account for the fact that insider ownership in very large corporations is less widespread. Moreover, governance mechanisms might be different in large companies. The growth potential (SALES G), which is expected to be captured in the market valuation of equity, is proxied by the average annual sales growth over the past three years, i.e. 2001 -2003. We include it in our analysis to differentiate higher market valuations arising from higher growth potential from those that might be the result of lower agency costs due to the alignment of interest among management and other shareholders. Firm specific risk (SIGMA) measures the standard deviation of 60 monthly stock returns. The dummy variable dividends (DIV) indicates whether dividends have been paid during 2003. The financial structure (LEVERAGE), measured as total debt to firm value, reflects the disciplining effect of higher interest burdens on managements' behavior. Differences in market valuation due to variations in operating performance were accounted for by including the return on assets (ROA), calculated as the ratio of operating profit to the average of total assets as of year end 2002 and 2003. Finally, industry dummy variables are used to account for heterogeneity among eight different industries 11 .
Descriptive Statistics
According to the data the mean ownership stake of insiders, as measured by cash flow rights, adds up to 27,8%. As can be seen from the summary statistics in table 4 incumbent executive board members control on average 9,6% of their firm's shares, while incumbent supervisory board members control 10,4% on average. The equity stake of former board members averages 7,8%. As a further result it should be emphasized that outside blockholders, i.e. all non-insiders that control a stake of at least 5% each, dispose of 33,0% on average. Finally, table 4 gives summary information about all the other variables used in this study.
Insert table 4
As can be seen from table 5 there are no remarkable differences among six of the eight industry categories. However, the insider ownership pattern in the food&beverages-as well as in the utilities-industry is quite different from other industries. In fact, the former has an unusual high insider ownership share of 49,8%, while in the latter the opposite is true with an insider share of 5,7%. Presumably, this result is driven by a size effect and small group sizes of the food&beverages (n = 11) and utilities industry (n = 17). Moreover, it should be noted that utilities in Germany in many cases are formerly state owned companies. Anyhow, it can be stated that insider ownership is a widespread phenomenon in listed German companies.
Insert table 5
As has already been emphasized, there is only a very small number of studies analyzing the ownership structure of German companies. For instance, Bott (2002, pp. 279-280) reports that as measured by the number of directly held share blocks, as registered with the BaFin at the end of 1999, individuals represent the most important shareholder group in as much as they account for 33,1% of all registered share blocks. Franks and Mayer (2001, p. 947) , investigating a sample of 171 German firms in 1990, find that family groups are the second most important owner group behind other corporates. The difference to our results, which are reported in table 6 and where corporates rank only second after insiders, could be explained by the fact that in 1990 disclosure of ownership stakes was only mandatory at the excess of control thresholds beyond 20%. Since in our sample the distribution of the ownership stakes of corporates is even more skewed than for individual insiders 12 , the changes in disclosure rules and the increasing transparency of ownership structures over the last decade revealed most notably also smaller ownership stakes. This may be the reason why insider ownership has become more visible over the last years. The same effect may explain the relatively low mean ownership stake for individuals of 10,8%, which was found by Köke (1999, p. 16) for listed corporations over the period 1994 to 1998.
The mean insider ownership stake of 27,8% in our sample is relatively large compared with findings from other countries. For instance, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988, p. 297 ) find a mean combined stake of all board members of 10,6% for listed US firms, which is close to the 12,1% which were found by Cho (1998, p. 107) . According to Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005, p . 651) the mean ownership stake held by the management of UK firms is 13,0%, while the same figure is equal to 17,3% for Switzerland, according to Schmid (2003, p. 39) . Although the insider ownership definition used in these studies is slightly different from the definition used in this paper, as we include former board members, it is nevertheless safe to say that insider ownership plays a more important role in German than in other countries. 13 Moreover, the peculiarity of the shareholder structure in Germany becomes even more pronounced, if all blockholdings by current or former board members as well as by other external individuals, companies or the government are summed up. In that case it turns out accordingly that the mean freefloat in a German listed company is only 39.2%. 14 Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005, p . 651) report that for the average UK firm the sum of management shareholdings plus external blockholdings is equal to 50,3%; from that one can conclude that the average freefloat should be equal to 49.7%. 15 For the US according to McConnell and Servaes (1990, p. 600 ) the sum of insider holdings and external blockholdings equals 37,4%. Hence, it is still true that dispersed ownership is less important in Germany than in the Anglo-Saxon world.
Insert table 6 ¿From these figures it seems that dispersed ownership is unexpectedly low, even in the US or UK. However, it should be noted that these figures are unweighted means and, hence, systematic differences in small and large companies are not taken into account. In fact, the picture becomes substantially different, if marketcap-weighted means are calculated, as has been done in the third column of table 6. In that case the average insider ownership stake is equal to 11,3% and the average freefloat increases up to 45,5%. Evidently, managerial ownership is the more relevant the smaller the market capitalization of a company. Although a comparable figure is, to our knowledge, not available for the US or UK, it can be safely assumed that the market-cap-weighted mean freefloat would be substantially higher than the 62.7% reported above. In fact, Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999, p. 362) find an average total managerial ownership stake of 13,4% for companies whose sales exceed $ 188 million while smaller companies show significantly higher insider ownership stakes between 25,4% ($ 22 million ≤ sales ≤ $ 188 million) and 32,0% (sales ≤ $ 22 million). Although these results do not include external blockholdings, it can be expected that even for such external stakes a clear size-effect exists.
A more precise picture of the size-effect can be gathered from table 7 where sample companies are grouped according to their insider ownership share. As indicated the distribution of the insider ownership variable MB SB FBM is heavily skewed and in 44,9% of the companies the insiders own less than 10% of the company's cash flow rights.
Insert table 7
4 Empirical Results
A first look at ownership and performance
We start with a simple two-sample t-test in order to gather some basic information about the relationship between insider ownership and performance. For that purpose the sample is split into two sub-samples using the insider ownership as discriminating variable. The results are reported in table 8. We find that the sub-sample with higher insider ownership exhibits a higher average Tobin's Q (1,27 vs. 1,21) but a lower average monthly stock return (0,2% vs. 0,4%). However, these differences are not significant. Nevertheless, the tests for differences in means, shown in table 8, highlight other interesting varieties in firm characteristics.
Insert table 8
For example, low insider ownership companies have a highly significant higher ownership share held by outside blockholders (58,6%) than high insider ownership companies (8,1%). This underlines the widespread existence of outside blockholdings and is in line with the evidence found by Becht and Böhmer (2003, p. 8 ) that 82,3% of listed German firms have a minority blockholder which controls more than 25%; 64,7% of listed firms are even majority controlled. Thus, it seems that outside block ownership might be a substitute to insider ownership and, hence, both ownership phenomenons have to be taken into account in the analysis. This assumption is further supported by the significant negative correlation between outside blockholdings and insider ownership, as reported in table 9. Furthermore, significant differences can be found for firm size, firm age, the number of management board members, the affiliation in a stock index and the existence of any kind of deviations from the one-share-one-vote principle.
Insert table 9
Examining the correlation matrix we observe that contradicting albeit insignificant correlations between the insider ownership variable and both performance variables exist. In the next sections the insider ownership-performance relationship will be analyzed in a multivariate regression framework.
Base case: OLS regression results
OLS regression results are presented in table 10, where models 1 and 2 use Tobin's Q (Q AV) as dependent variable, whereas models 3 and 4 use stock returns (SR AV). Since we felt the need to learn more about the appropriate measure for insider ownership in Germany we carried out the regression analysis with the three insider ownership variables individually (i.e. MB, SB, and FBM) in models 1 and 3 and with the aggregated insider ownership variable (i.e. MB SB FBM) in models 2 and 4. We had complete data sets for only 238 of the 245 sample companies, which constitutes our final sample size for all regression analyses. In contrast to the univariate analysis in section 3.4, in the multivariate analyzes the signs of all insider ownership coefficients in models 1 to 4 are positive, indicating a positive impact of insider ownership on firm value. However, not all of the coefficients turn out to be significantly different from zero. For the aggregate insider ownership variable, i.e. MB SB FBM, we get a significant result in both regression specifications. This yields a first indication that there might be an economic rationale for firm performance to be influenced by insider ownership.
Insert table 10
With regard to the explanatory power of the models it should be noted that the adjusted R 2 is equal to 52%, if stock returns are used as dependent variable, and equal to 30%, if Tobin's Q is used. This is in line with the view that Tobin's Q cannot be appropriately calculated for German companies. 16 Thus, we will use model 4 as the base case, which will be discussed in more detail. The insider ownership coefficient of 0,009 -significant at the 0,05 level -states that on average an increase in insider ownership by 100 basis points results in an increase of the five year stock price performance of 54 basis points. Among the control variables for firm characteristics, firm size (LN ASSETS), growth potential (SALES G), stock price volatility (SIGMA), dividend payments (DIV), and the return on assets (ROA) have a positive effect on stock returns, while high levels of debt (LEVERAGE) turn out to have a negative impact (all significant at the 0,01 level). While the positive effects of sales growth, dividend payments and return on assets may be intuitively plausible, the remaining effects deserve further discussion. One possible explanation for the negative effect of high debt levels might be that small and highly leveraged firms experienced more serious devaluations in their stock prices during the market downturn from 2001 to 2003. On the other hand, the positive sign of the coefficient of firm specific risk, measured by the standard deviation of stock returns, could signify that those firms which managed to recover from their drops in market values of equity showed higher return variations than those which did not. Furthermore, we find in our data that a firm's market risk, as measured by its beta, is positively associated with total stock price risk. 17 Finally, the results strongly support the presumption that board ownership and outside blockholdings are a substitute to each other. In fact, according to model 4 in table 10 the marginal rate of substitution is equal to 0,009/0,012=0,75. Hence, a change in insider ownership by 100 basis points must be accompanied by an offsetting change of 75 basis points in external blockholdings in order not to have any impact on firm performance. In a very strict sense it follows from this that external blockholdings are more effective in terms of value creation. However, given the variance in the data one should not insist on this result. As a corollary, it is interesting to note that the coefficient on the number of blockholders variable is significantly negative. This is in line with the view that the benefits of outside control decrease the more dispersed blockholdings are.
Variations to the base case
After assuming a pure linear specification of the impact of insider ownership on performance in the previous section, we now investigate the possibility of alternative specifications. We search for the curvilinear relationship found by McConnell and Servaes (1990) by including the squared term of board member ownership, labelled as MB SB FBM SQ in model 5 of table 11. As a result, the coefficient for MB SB FBM becomes slightly negative but not on a significant level. The coefficient of the squared term (MB SB FBM SQ) is positive but not on a significant level. Thus, we fail to find the bell-shape relationship found by McConnell and Servaes where insider ownership above a certain threshold becomes value destroying. 18 This is quite interesting, as the result is not in accordance with the view that large insider stakes are harmful to outside shareholders because of their expropriation via the consumption of private benefits by insiders. 19
Insert table 11
17 The correlation coefficient (Pearson) between SIGMA, as a measure of total stock price risk, and beta, calculated from a regression on 60 monthly CDAX returns, is 0,634 and significant at the 0,01 level. 18 We doubt the reliability of results including higher terms of insider ownership as independent variables because of the arising multicollinearity. In our sample the VIFs for MB SB FBM and MB SB FBM SQ reach 15,9 and 12,1 respectively indicating presence of multicollinearity. We find no procedure to deal with this problem in McConnell and Servaes (1990) . 19 It should be noted that we also included higher terms of MB SB FBM as done by Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005) without obtaining more promising results than those found in our base case model 4.
We also checked whether it would be possible to replicate the piecewise-linear relationship found by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) or Cho (1998) . Dividing the insider ownership variable in three subvariables -one for low (MB SB FBM 0to5), medium (MB SB FBM 5to25) and high (MB SB FBM 25to100) insider ownership stakes -using the thresholds of 5% and 25% as proposed by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, only the coefficient for insider ownership above 25% turned out to be significant, even though at the 0,1 level only. This can be seen from the results of model 6 in table 11. Even by looking at several different combinations of the thresholds we have not been able to improve the results. Hence, the linear relationship between insider ownership and firm performance, as used in model 4, seems to represent still the most convincing specification.
Suggestions to alter the insider ownership variable to reflect the concentration of insider ownership or the dollar value of the ownership share were implemented in models 7 and 8, respectively. In model 7a, the coefficient for the average ownership share per board member (MB SB FBM AV) was positive (0,076) and even more significant than in the base case. Nevertheless, we regard this result with caution because of the methodic issue involved: Since we are not able to obtain the number of all former board members (nor we think that this would be especially useful), the divisor of the average insider ownership variable contains the share of all active and former board members while the denominator does only reflect all active board members. Basically, the result of model 7a may be a consequence of the result already obtained in model 3 of table 10, where we have seen that the impact of former board member stakes tends to be stronger than those of incumbent board members. In model 7b we take a different approach to account for the concentration of insider ownership: Besides the cumulated shareholdings of insiders (MB SB FBM) we include the number of those registered insider shareholders (MB SB FBM NO) as an additional explanatory variable. The result is similar to those previously found for the case of blockholders: While MB SB FBM is positive, MB SB FBM NO is negative (both significant at the 0,05 level) indicating that the positive effect declines, if the insider ownership share is spread across an increasing number of insiders. Even though the results of model 7b appear as plausible as the base case specification of model 4 we will stick to the base case model 4 in the next section because of the advantages associated with dealing with only one -and not two -possible endogenous insider variables. Finally, in model 8 inside ownership is measured in terms of the Euro-value instead in terms of the equity share. The accordingly defined variable (MB SB FBM EUR) turns out to be insignificant. To summarize, it doesn't seem that any of the variations of the insider ownership variable discussed before generates more reliable results than the simple insider ownership measure MB SB FBM used in the base case model 4 of the analysis.
The possible impact of endogeneity
In the OLS regression analysis insider ownership was implicitly assumed to be an exogenous variable. Because of the objections raised by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and many others, which have been discussed in section 2, we follow the common approach to construct a simultaneous equation system in order to account for the potentially reciprocal dependence of insider ownership and firm performance. 20
Specifically, we estimate a simultaneous equation system treating insider ownership and corporate value as endogenous variables using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. Our systems consists of the following two equations:
Corporate value =
(1) f (Insider ownership, f irm characteristics) Insider ownership =
(2) g(Corporate value, f irm characteristics)
Equation (1) Equation (2), the insider ownership equation, treats corporate performance, measured by stock returns, as an endogenous variable. To meet the specification condition for simultaneous equation systems we exclude the dividend payment variable (DIV) from equation (2), since we do not believe that insiders would choose their share participation level according to expected dividend payments. In addition to the other control variables from equation (1), we include four new variables which we expect to have an impact on the level of insider ownership. We expect insider ownership to be lower in codetermined companies (CODET) and in companies with a large number of management board members (MB NO). 21 In contrast, we believe that the existence of non-voting shares (VOTE), which facilitates the insiders to gain control rights in excess of their cash flow rights, and a high ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INT ASSETS), a measure for discretionary power of management, will favorably influence the extent of insider ownership. Since it can be plausibly argued that insider ownership and corporate performance share common determinants, 22 we use the set of all exogenous variables from model 9 and 11 as instrumental variables for the endogenous variables in model 10 and 12. The OLS-and 2SLS regression results for both equations are shown in table 12.
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As the insider ownership variable in model 10 still has a positive coefficient (significant at the 0,1 level) while the corporate value variable in model 12 has a negativ though insignificant coefficient, we do not find evidence for the hypothesis that the OLS results might be strongly biased through the possible endogeneity of insider ownership. 23 Thus, our results conflict with the evidence presented by e.g. 21 German codetermination law requires that in companies of a certain size half of the supervisory board members must be representatives of the employees. Since this narrows the scope of managerial actions the managers might be restrained from owning larger stakes in such types of companies. Cf. Gorton and Schmid (2000) . 22 Cf. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999, p. 379) . 23 As a corollary it should be noted that the results of equation 10 indicate that insider ownership is more effective in value creation than external blockholdings, as the ratio of both coefficients is equal to 1.5. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998) , who show that a positive impact of insider ownership on corporate value is a mere result of failing to control for endogeneity. In contrast, our findings are roughly in line with those of Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2005) who also find a positive impact of insider ownership on corporate performance, even when they account for the possible endogeneity of insider ownership.
As a final piece of evidence against endogeneity in the insider ownership variable the stickiness of this variable should be emphasized. For that purpose the question is addressed to what extent current insider ownership is explained by former insider ownership. More specifically, model 11 in table 12 is estimated once again as an OLS-regression. This corresponds to model 13 in table 13. Thereafter, insider ownership measured as of the end of the year 1998 is used as an additional independent variable. As can be seen from the results of model 14 in table 13, this variable adds perceivable explanatory power to the regression and is highly significant. Hence, current insider ownership structure depends significantly on former insider ownership corroborating the view of the stickiness of this variable.
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To sum up, the results presented in this study corroborate the view that under the German corporate governance environment insider ownership may, to some extent, be resistant to market mechanisms. This view is supported by the argument of Edwards and Nibler (2000, p. 252) which justify their treatment of ownership concentration as exogenous variable by the observation that ". . . the ownership structures of many large German firms [. . . ] do not change much over time". Later, Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) test for endogeneity by dividing their sample in two parts, one with and one without changes in ownership structure. They infer that because the results for the two subsamples are not different on a significant level, ownership probably is not endogenous. Weighing all known arguments and evaluating the empirical evidence, it may be plausible to treat insider ownership as an exogenous variable, at least for Germany. Under this perspective this study provides interesting evidence on the impact of insider ownership on firm performance.
Problems and Subjects of Further Research
It is well known that 2SLS-estimations are quite sensitive to the specification of the equation system. The theory for choosing instrumental variables is poor and variations in the choice of instruments can significantly effect the results. 24 This is a severe problem of all empirical studies dealing with simultaneous equation systems. As pointed out by Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999, p. 379 ) 'instrumental variables for managerial ownership are difficult to find. The basic problem is that for any variable that plausibly determines the optimal level of managerial ownership, it is also possible to argue that the same variable might plausibly affect Tobin's Q [as a measure for corporate value].' Hence, it was argued here that endogeneity is not only a question of how the results of an ordinary OLS-equation compare to the results of an appropriate 2SLS-estimation. It is also a question of economic and empirical reasoning. Given that it could have been showed that insider ownership is a rather inert variable, endogeneity may be perceived as less imminent than in the US data. There, insider ownership is much more related to firm performance, as it is to a large extent the result of compensation contracts. This is still very different from the German situation.
Of course, future research should still address the issue of endogeneity. One way to do so is to extend the cross-sectional data set to a low frequency unbalanced panel data set. This would allow to use lagged variables as more plausible instruments and to increase the sample size in a pooled cross section analysis. This procedure is also suggested by Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002) , which provide a comprehensive review of the problems involved in empirical corporate governance studies.
Conclusion
This paper addressed the question whether there is any empirical relationship between corporate performance and insider ownership. Although agency theory provides some good reasons why such a relationship should exist, empirical evidence is rather fuzzy in this regard. One reason is that most studies deal with Anglo-Saxon countries, where it seems that results are significantly affected by an endogeneity problem. This problem is due to the fact that in these countries insider ownership seems to be mainly driven by compensation contracts. Evidently, in such a case firm performance and insider ownership are simultaneously determined.
This paper deals with the German capital market. This is important for the following reasons. First, insider ownership in Germany is a widespread phenomenon that is only partially influenced by the fact that firms grant stock based compensation packages. In fact, insider ownership seems to be rather stable over time in Germany. Second, it seems that there is much more cross-sectional variation in the ownership structure in Germany as compared to the US. Starting from this presumption the results in this paper make a contribution to the literature for the following two reasons. First, if it is true that the relationship between firm performance and insider ownership is not significantly affected by endogeneity, the data will allow to make an unbiased observation as to whether insider ownership affects firm performance. Second, this study is among the first to give a comprehensive overview on the ownership structure of German corporations. Using a data set of 245 companies for the year 2003 we find evidence for a positive and significant relationship between corporate performance, as measured by stock price performance as well as by Tobin's Q, and insider ownership. This relationship seems to be rather robust. Specifically, the sign and significance of the relationship does not change, even if we account for endogeneity by applying a 2SLS regression approach. Moreover, we also find outside block ownership as well as more concentrated insider ownership to have a positive impact on corporate performance. Overall the results indicate that ownership structure might be an important variable explaining the long term value creation in the corporate sector. The scheme was developed for this specific research project and is characterized by the explicit consideration of insider ownership. Other, more common classification schemes only use the categories "private households", "individuals" or "families" without further distinguishing among different types of individuals (e.g. outsiders and insiders) and, hence, are not appropriate for our research purpose. Variable for piecewise-linear regression (see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988, p. 298) ). MB SB FBM is between 0 and 5 percent.
MB SB FBM 5to25
Variable for piecewise-linear regression (see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988, p. 298) ). MB SB FBM is between 5 and 25 percent.
MB SB FBM 25to100
Variable for piecewise-linear regression (see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988, p. 298) The definitions of all variables can be found in table 3. c *, ** and *** indicate significance on the 0,10, 0,05 and 0,01 level (2-tailed). 
Intercept 0,727 0,662 -0,025 -0,025 (1,567)
(1,455) (-2,765) *** (-2,861) *** MB 0,336 0,009 (1,560)
(1,663) * SB 0,261 0,007 (1, 180) (1,459) FBM 0,609 0,010 (2,490) ** (2,235) ** MB SB FBM 0,42 0,009 (2,144) ** (2,141) ** LN ASSETS 0,019 0,023 0,002 0,002 (0,699) (0,881) (3,242) *** (3,416) *** SALES G -0,012 -0,045 0,011 0,011 (-0,118) (-0,439) (1,780) * (1,768) * SIGMA 2,055 2,019 0,075 0,075 (2,852) *** (2,791) *** (4,210) *** (4,252) *** DIV 0,028 0,021 0,010 0,009 (0,352) (0,242) (4,255) *** (4,328) *** LEVERAGE -0,825 -0,828 -0,021 -0,021 (-6,834) *** (-6,734) *** (-6,843) *** (-6,850) *** BLOCK O 0,325 0,338 0,012 0,012 (2,224) ** (2,327) ** (3,818) *** (3,863) *** BLOCK NO 0,001 0,002 -0,001 -0,001 (0,030) (0,067) (-1,919) * (-1,916) * ROA 0,997 0,968 0,028 0,028 (1,933) * (1,879) * (2,800) *** (2,787) *** table 3 . c *, ** and *** indicate significance on the 0,10, 0,05 and 0,01 level (2-tailed). d In our base case model 4, four of the eight industry dummies (including the intercept) enter the regression model on a significant level of at least 0,05. e We believe the model to be rather stable to variations in the selection of the control variables, since the VIFs of all variables are below 3,7 (not shown in the table). 
Intercept -0,022 -0,023 -0,029 -0,024 -0,018 (-2,578) *** (-2,590) *** (-3,546) *** (-2,831) *** (-2,489)*** MB SB FBM -0,005 0,011 (-0,541) (2,568) ** MB SB FBM SQ 0,016 (1,588) MB SB FBM 0to5 -0,079 (-0,850) MB SB FBM 5to25 0,018 (0,678) MB SB FBM 25to100 0,012 (1,990) * MB SB FBM AV 0,076 (2,655) *** MB SB FBM NO -0,001 (-2,130) ** MB SB FBM EUR 0,000 (0,726) LN ASSETS 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,001 (3,054) *** (3,085) *** (3,978) *** (3,485) *** (3,041) *** SALES G 0,010 0,010 0,010 0,010 0,012 (1,785) * (1,766) * (1,922) * (1,729) * (1,791) * SIGMA 0,077 0,078 0,072 0,077 0,070 (4,435) *** (4,382) *** (4,355) *** (4,432) *** (3,998) *** DIV 0,010 0,010 0,009 0,01 0,009 (4,539) *** (4,491) *** (4,465) *** (4,421) *** (4,132) *** LEVERAGE -0,021 -0,021 -0,022 -0,021 -0,021 (-6,868) *** (-7,074) *** (-7,171) *** (-6,948) *** (-6,403) *** BLOCK O 0,010 0,010 0,012 0,011 0,008 (3,339) *** (3,296) *** (4,343) *** (3,649) *** (3,219) *** BLOCK NO -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,002 (-1,6906) * (-1,448) (-1,793) * (-1,814) * (-2,608) ** ROA 0,028 0,028 0,027 0,027 0,026 (2,818) *** (2,919) *** (2,750) *** (2,795) *** (2,508) ** table 3 . c *, ** and *** indicate significance on the 0,10, 0,05 and 0,01 level (2-tailed). d Variations of the insider ownership thresholds in equation 6 were performed. However, the results are not shown because none of these variations delivered considerably better results than those by using the 5% and 25% thresholds originally used by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) . e In model 5 the VIFs for MB SB FBM and MB SB FBM SQ are 15,9 and 12,1 respectively indicating the presence of multicollinearity. table 3 . c *, ** and *** indicate significance on the 0,10, 0,05 and 0,01 level (2-tailed).
